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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID DELL DRAGE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 960100-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the 
police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Drage was 
armed and presently dangerous to support a Terry frisk based solely 
on his presence at a residence where a narcotics search warrant was 
being executed? 
Standard of review. 
"We conclude that the proper standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court determination of whether a 
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion 
is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a 
fact determination reviewable for clear error." We 
further conclude that the reasonable-suspicion legal 
standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to 
the trial judge when applying that standard to a given 
set of facts." 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). Preserved below by 
motion to suppress, R. 21-5 (motion), 82-226 (hearing). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling in the 
alternative that the search of Mr. Drage was justified as a search 
incident to arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia? 
Standard of Review. See standard for issue no. 1. 
Factual findings underlying the trial court's determination are 
reviewed for clear error, with appellant having the burden to 
marshal the evidence. Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985). Preserved below by motion to suppress, R. 21-5 
(motion), 82-226 (hearing). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant David Dell Drage was charged by information 
dated January 27, 1995 with possession of heroin within 1000 feet 
of a school, a second degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 7-8. Mr. Drage moved to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of his fourth amendment and 
article I, section 14 rights. R. 21-5. After hearing, R. 82-226, 
the trial court denied the motion. R. 225-6 (bench remarks), 31 
(minute entry).x Mr. Drage now appeals pursuant to a conditional 
guilty plea. R. 34-40 (statement of defendant/certificate/order), 
32-3 (minute entry), 44-5 (judgement, sentence, commitment). A 0-5 
year prison term was stayed pending satisfactory completion of 
probation. R. 44. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 5:17 P.M. on January 25, 1995, police executed a no-
knock search warrant at the residence located at 1234 West Iola. 
R. 88-95. The search warrant was admitted as exhibit 1-D at the 
suppression hearing, R. 93, and is attached (together with its 
supporting affidavit) as addendum A. The search warrant was 
premised on information from a confidential informant that a man 
named "Arturo," last name unknown, did not live at the house but, 
with permission of owner Frank Penman, was dealing drugs from the 
house from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. daily. Warrant Affidavit, p. 3. 
The confidential informant also indicated that "Randy," last name 
unknown, was a parole fugitive and was residing on the premises. 
Id. Surveillance conducted on January 20-22 observed 21 
individuals visiting the premises, some with prior arrests 
Although the court's minute entry directs the State to 
prepare findings and conclusions, evidently none were prepared, as 
none are contained in the record. 
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involving drug offenses. Warrant Affidavit, pp. 3-4. Mr. Drage 
was not one of the 21 individuals observed during surveillance. R. 
114. Mr. Drage was not identified in the warrant. R. 115. The 
warrant affidavit said nothing at all about Frank Penman, Arturo, 
or Randy being suspected of possessing any weapons, or using any 
weapons in the past. R. 116-8. No guns were found in the 
residence. R. 118-9. 
The warrant was executed without warning using a 
battering ram. R. 120. Each officer was in "full raid gear," 
including bullet-proof vests. R. 96. Nine or ten officers 
entered with guns drawn. R. 97, 120-1. Seven individuals were 
found in the residence. R. 128-9, 142; ex. 3-D (addendum C) . All 
were in the front room except for one individual in the bathroom, 
and one in the kitchen. R. 136. When the officers entered, Mr. 
Drage was approximately 5 or 6 feet from the door sitting on a 
love-seat type couch. R. 98-9. Each of the seven occupants was 
secured. R. 128, 141. Mr. Drage was cooperative with the 
officers. R. 122, 128, 130, 144. One occupant (fugitive Randy 
Chatfield) resisted briefly, all others were compliant. R. 122, 
134; ex. 3-D (addendum C) . Correctional Officer Metcalf had no 
idea what Mr. Drage's purpose in being on the premises was, or if 
that purpose was criminal or non-criminal. R. 134-5. 
Each occupant was searched by pat down and by checking 
their pockets, R. 129, "and finding out what kind of things they 
had in their pockets and on their person". R. 130. Of the four 
individuals present who were not named in the warrant, only Mr. 
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Drage was arrested. R. 130. Correctional Officer Metcalf's report 
indicates that Mr. Drage was searched incident to arrest. R. 131; 
ex. 3-D (addendum C). Correctional Officer Mike Smilker secured 
Mr. Drage, who was handcuffed and placed face down on the floor. 
R. 102, 13 8. Mr. Drage did not produce or mention any weapons. R. 
144. Correctional Officer Smilker searched Mr. Drage, who was 
handcuffed during the search. R. 104, 13 9-141. Correctional 
Officer Smilker testified that standard procedure during execution 
of a search warrant is to handcuff all persons present, and search 
them, including going through their wallets. R. 143. 
Correctional Officer Metcalf testified at the suppression 
hearing that he noticed needles and twists in plain view on the 
couch and a coffee table, within three to five feet of Mr. Drage. 
R. 99, 123. However, all police reports are devoid of any 
reference whatsoever to plain view paraphernalia. Officer 
Metcalf's evidence report,2 which he agreed was complete and 
thorough, R. 124, fails to indicate anywhere that needles were 
found on a coffee table. R. 126. None of the reports indicate 
that any needles were found in plain view. R. 127. The only 
reference to needles in the evidence report is on page 1 line 3, in 
conjunction with the maroon bag with cook kit found in the hall 
closet. R. 127.3 Correctional Officer Metcalf agreed that any 
needles found in plain view should have been preserved, and listed 
20fficer Metcalf prepared the evidence report for all evidence 
found during the warrant execution. R. 106. 
3The fourth entry on page 1 does not say what it is referring 
to, and may well be a reference to needles or syringes. 
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on the evidence report. R. 123-5. The officers testified that 
they consider needles to be dangerous weapons. R. 103, 13 9. 
Mr. Drage testified that he arrived at 1234 West Iola at 
approximately 4:15 P.M. R. 147. Frank Penman was a long term 
friend of his, and he stopped to visit. Id. Mr. Drage visited 
with Mr. Penman, and watched television. R. 147, 167. Mr. Drage 
testified that the only items on the coffee table were an ashtray, 
lighter, cigarettes, and a couple magazines. No needles or 
paraphernalia were in plain view on the coffee table. R. 148-9, 
167. Mr. Drage testified that the forcible entry was quite 
alarming, "mass confusion," and that he was in a state of shock. 
R. 149-51. He was thrown to the floor and dragged into the 
hallway, about five feet. R. 153. Correctional Officer Smilker 
asked if Mr. Drage had any syringes, and he replied, "No." R. 
153.4 The officer never asked if Mr. Drage had any weapons. R. 
165.5 After Mr. Drage was handcuffed, the Correctional Officer 
Smilker proceeded to search Mr. Drage's pockets, emptying their 
contents, starting with the left rear pocket which contained bus 
schedules and a condom. R. 153. There were no hard objects in 
that pocket. R. 153-4. The officer then searched the right hip 
pocket, pulling out Mr. Drage's plastic comb. R. 154. Mr. Drage 
was then rolled on his side, and the outside pockets of his coat 
Correctional Officer Smilker testified that Mr. Drage "didn't 
say anything that I recollect" in response to his query. R. 139. 
Correctional Officer Smilker testified that he asked Mr. 
Drage if he had any needles or other weapons. R. 139. 
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were searched. Then his coat was opened, and the officer removed 
the syringe. R. 156. 
The suppression motion was argued to the court one issue 
at a time, and the court ruled on each issue from the bench. 
First, the trial court ruled that the search warrant did not 
authorize the search of unnamed persons who might happen to be 
present at the time of warrant execution. R. 194-6 (addendum D). 
Next, the trial court ruled that the facts supporting the warrant 
were sufficient to permit a frisk of everyone on the premises, in 
essence adopting an automatic frisk doctrine. R. 214-5 (addendum 
D). Finally, the court ruled that there was probable cause for an 
arrest for paraphernalia, and the search of Mr. Drage was valid as 
a search incident to arrest. R. 225-6 (addendum D). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The police had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
believe that Mr. Drage was armed or dangerous. Absent such 
particularized suspicion, the Terry frisk of Mr. Drage was 
unconstitutional. In upholding the Terry frisk, the trial court 
relied solely on the probable cause supporting the warrant to 
search the premises, and the fact that Mr. Drage was present on 
those premises at the time the search was conducted. Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) 
condemned the pat-down search of persons merely present during 
execution of a narcotics warrant. State v. White. 856 P. 2d 656 
(Utah App. 1993) rejected the notion that an automatic frisk is 
7 
permissible based on mere suspected drug use. The Terry frisk here 
was unconstitutional. 
The trial court's alternative finding that the search of 
Mr. Drage was proper incident to his arrest for alleged plain view 
paraphernalia is clearly erroneous. Officer Metcalf's testimony is 
entirely uncorroborated. No plain view needles or paraphernalia 
were collected or recorded. Not a single police report, despite 
nine or ten officers being present, mentions plain view 
paraphernalia. Other persons present with the alleged plain view 
paraphernalia were not arrested. The great weight of the evidence 
shows that there was no plain view paraphernalia. Mr. Drage was 
arrested solely because of the syringe found pursuant to the 
unlawful search of his person. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE POLICE HAD NO REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION THAT MR. DRAGE WAS ARMED AND 
DANGEROUS TO SUPPORT A TERRY FRISK. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-5, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court affirmed the use of a 
weapons frisk to allow officers to protect themselves by searching 
and disarming potentially dangerous suspects. The burden is on the 
State to show that a frisk is justified by the circumstances of the 
encounter. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-5, 91 
S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). 
A. THERE WAS NO PARTICULARIZED INFORMATION 
WITH RESPECT TO MR. DRAGE SUGGESTING THAT 
HE WAS ARMED OR DANGEROUS. 
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In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 
L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Supreme Court examined the Terry frisk 
doctrine in the context of persons present during the execution of 
a valid search warrant. Based on information from a confidential 
informant, police had obtained a warrant to search the Aurora Tap 
Tavern and "Greg," a bartender alleged to be selling heroin from 
the premises. The seven or eight officers executing the warrant 
found 9 to 13 patrons present. Each was frisked for weapons; 
heroin was discovered on the person of Ybarra. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 
87-89. 
The Court first determined that the warrant did not 
authorize the search of unnamed persons on the premises. Ybarra, 
444 U.S. at 90 & n.2.6 
The Supreme Court found probable cause to search the 
patrons lacking: 
But, a person's mere propinquity to others independently 
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, 
give rise to probable cause to search that person. 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 
1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917. Where the standard is probable 
cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported 
by probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided 
by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there 
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to 
search the premises where the person may happen to be. 
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 
"legitimate expectations of privacy" of persons, not 
places." 
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. 
6The district court correctly found similarly here. R. 194-6 
(addendum D) . Compare State v. Covington, 904 P. 2d 209 (Utah App. 
1995) (upholding "all persons" warrant upon sufficient showing of 
probable cause). 
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The Court then proceeded to analyze whether a Terry frisk 
of Ybarra was permissible, and concluded: 
The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by 
a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently 
dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held 
must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for 
weapons." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 
S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 
392 U.S., at 21-24, 27, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881, 1883. 
When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 
1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the 
customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized 
him as a person with a criminal history nor had any 
particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to 
assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later 
testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no 
indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or 
other actions indicative of an intent to commit an 
assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not 
threatening. At the suppression hearing, the most Agent 
Johnson could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a 
3/4-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits 
could be expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois 
in early March. In short, the State is unable to 
articulate any specific fact that would have justified a 
police officer at the scene in even suspecting that 
Ybarra was armed and dangerous. 
Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 92-3. 
The same is true here. Mr. Drage was completely 
cooperative with the officers. R. 122, 128, 13 0, 144. Mr. Drage 
did not produce or mention any weapons. R. 144. The warrant did 
not mention Mr. Drage, R. 115, and did not mention that any of the 
three identified persons (owner Frank Penman, dealer "Arturo", and 
fugitive "Randy") were suspected of having weapons or a prior 
history of violent crimes or use of weapons. R. 116-8. "The 
1
 narrow scope1 of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for 
weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the 
person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on 
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premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." 
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94. 
Utah case law is in accord: 
[A] person's mere presence in the company of others whom 
the police have probable cause to search does not provide 
probable cause to search that person. United States v. 
Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S. Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed. 210 
(1948). Nor are police officers authorized to search an 
individual merely because that person is present on 
premises for which a search has been authorized, id. , 
unless there is some independent probable cause to 
justify a search of the individual. 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986); State v. Northrup, 
756 P.2d 1288, 1295 (Utah App. 1988) (probable cause requirement 
cannot be undercut by merely pointing out that there is probable 
cause to search the premises where the person is found); State v. 
Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1988) ("Because the standard of 
probable cause must be particularized to every person or place to 
be searched, a warrant authorizing the search of premises does not 
authorize officers to search an individual merely because that 
person is present on the premises, unless there is some independent 
probable cause to justify a search of that individual."). 
Here, the police had nothing more than was present in 
Ybarra. There was no information specific to Mr. Drage that would 
indicate to the police that Mr. Drage was armed or dangerous. The 
weapons frisk of Mr. Drage was unconstitutional. 
B. EXECUTION OF A NARCOTICS WARRANT DOES NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY AUTHORIZE A FRISK OF ALL 
PERSONS PRESENT AT THE PREMISES TO BE 
SEARCHED. 
11 
Officer Smilker testified that standard procedure during 
execution of a search warrant is to handcuff all persons present, 
and search them, including going through their wallets. R. 143. 
Under this procedure, the police necessarily are operating under 
the assumption that they have an automatic right to both frisk and 
search anyone on the premises during execution of a search warrant. 
In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), this Court 
rejected any such contention. 
White involved investigation of a parolee alleged by his 
former wife to have been using cocaine, and to have been involved 
in a domestic disturbance earlier in the day. Upon contacting 
White, the officer conducted a weapons frisk: 
Officer Yurgelon testified that he had stopped 
defendant and requested him to exit the car because of 
his suspicion that defendant had violated his parole and 
had possibly been involved in a domestic disturbance. He 
conceded, however, that observation of defendant while in 
the vehicle and while exiting it gave "no indication that 
[defendant] was armed." Officer Yurgelon saw no gun, 
knife, or similar weapon. He also noted that defendant 
was "mellow" and cooperative. However, because Officer 
Yurgelon was concerned that defendant's heavy coat could 
be concealing weapons, he frisked defendant. 
White, 856 P.2d at 658. 
The court considered a multitude of factors in assessing 
whether the frisk was warranted, including reliability of third 
party information, reasonableness of verbal inquiry, any response 
thereto, and the lack of any automatic frisk right for mere drug 
use or possession. 
The court concluded that the officer should have 
conducted a preliminary inquiry into whether Mr. White was armed: 
12 
We agree with defendant that his case is 
distinguishable from Williams.m The officers converged 
on defendant in mid-afternoon, greatly outnumbered him 
and presumably were armed. They observed nothing 
indicative of criminal activity and had been given no 
prior information indicating that defendant was armed. 
These circumstances, combined with defendant's lack of 
menacing behavior, created an environment in which the 
responding officers could question defendant without fear 
for their safety. Where a confrontation develops in such 
a manner that questioning can be safely undertaken to 
substantiate or dispel suspicions originally aroused by 
third party hearsay rather than actual observation, 
preliminary inquiry may be especially appropriate. 
White, 856 P.2d at 662-3. 
The court considered whether drug use warranted an 
automatic frisk, and concluded it did not. Noting that certain 
crimes are inherently violent, see Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and 
Seizure, § 9.4(a) at 506 (2nd ed. 1987),8 this Court determined 
that cocaine use does not fall into that category. White, 856 P. 2d 
at 664. The court concluded: 
In objectively reviewing the totality of facts 
in this case in light of this requirement, we note that 
the allegations of criminal activity were provided by 
unverified third party hearsay. The suggestion of a 
domestic disturbance was attenuated, and the allegation 
of drug use did not generally implicate an inherently 
dangerous situation or specifically indicate that the 
suspect was armed. Officer Yurgelon approached defendant 
under relatively safe conditions, during midday, in a 
parking lot, and in the company of three other officers. 
On-scene observations allowed the officers to make a 
7Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 
L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (holding that officers may forego an initial 
inquiry when, because of specific circumstances, questioning would 
be dangerous to the officer). 
8See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
(automatic frisk of burglary suspect permissible); State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(automatic frisk of persons transporting large quantities of drugs 
permissible). 
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positive identification of the suspect, but they did not 
indicate present or intended criminal activity. The 
officers made no inquiries concerning the alleged 
domestic violence or cocaine use and the suspect's 
companion expressed no distress. During his minimal 
contact with defendant prior to frisking him, Officer 
Yurgelon noted that defendant was cooperative and mellow 
and followed directions without protest. This affect and 
response contradicted Officer Yurgelon's experience and 
expectations of an individual under the influence of 
cocaine. Although defendant was recognized as a former 
prison inmate and was wearing a winter coat, the officers 
observed neither a suspicious bulge nor any evasive or 
threatening behavior. 
These facts demonstrate no circumstances 
indicating that an automatic or immediate frisk was 
appropriate. 
White, 856 P.2d at 666. 
Here, the situation was similar. There was nothing to 
indicate that Mr. Drage was involved in any criminal activity. 
There was no information concerning possible weapons. Mr. Drage 
was cooperative and compliant with commands. He had been 
handcuffed, and was on the floor. There were nine or ten armed 
officers in the residence, more than sufficient to secure all seven 
occupants. There was no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. 
Drage was armed or dangerous, and all observations of his behavior 
during the warrant execution belied any such notion. 
The trial court here ruled: 
[T]here is a basis for a Terry frisk. And I think the 
dispositive critical facts are the ones that have already 
been identified as the ones that establish the basis for 
the no-knock warrant: the fact that we have surveillance 
of the house indicating short-term visits, we have 
confidential informants, we have at least reasonable 
suspicion, or more than that we have probable cause to 
believe that there's a fugitive in the house and that 
there is a suspected drug dealer in the house. 
All of that seemed to me to create a totality 
of circumstances from which the officer could find a 
basis for concern for their own safety that would justify 
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a search, a Terry frisk, as part of the no-knock in 
securing what I was interested in hearing arguments 
about. And I think I'm satisfied when officers go on and 
secure a premise, to impose upon them the duty to sort or 
look at everybody and say: ["]Okay. Now, I'm not going 
to search you. I can pat you down. I'm going to 
handcuff you.["] 
That's asking for too much refinement of what 
is otherwise a very dangerous situation. They have to 
have guidance and it seems to me that once they're 
justified for the no-knock and once they have a warrant 
that suggests that there's drug use, drug dealing and 
fugitives and all that accompanied in this warrant, when 
they go in the officers can both secure the parties that 
are there to assure their safety and assure the public's 
safety and to assure that there would be no destruction 
of evidence. [9] And as part of that they can also do at 
least a pat-down search. 
R. 214-5. 
The trial court is authorizing automatic patdowns of 
everyone found on the premises of any warrant execution searching 
for drugs. This is improper under White. While the police were 
certainly justified in searching the fugitive and the drug dealer 
incident to arrest, this does not justify a search of Mr. Drage. 
Under Terry, individualized suspicion is required. It is absent 
here. The search of Mr. Drage was unconstitutional. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
SEARCH OF MR. DRAGE WAS PERMISSIBLE AS A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD. 
90f course, evidence preservation in not a proper purpose for 
a weapons pat-down. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94 (rejecting contention 
that "the Terry 'reasonable belief or suspicion' standard should be 
made applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the 
search warrant."). 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
OFFICER METCALF'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN PLAIN VIEW IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
In an alternative holding, the trial court found: 
And I listened to the testimony of the officers, and even 
though they didn't list the paraphernalia that was in the 
front room on the evidence sheet, I felt that they10 were 
credible. Certainly they couldn't identify that 
paraphernalia as being the defendant's in this case. But 
in my view the fact that there was paraphernalia around 
there as well as the presence of drug trafficking, which 
I think was clearly identified, along with the other 
factors that have already been enunciated at the hearing, 
it seemed to me that there was plenty of probable cause 
for arrest and a search incident to that arrest which was 
sufficiently contemporaneous with the discovery of the 
needle which was detected by the pat-down to a proper 
basis to deny the motion to suppress. So for the reasons 
the court stated I'm going to deny the motion. 
I would ask Mr. Meister if you would prepare 
detailed findings on this.[11] I think we have a case in 
which there are a number of close questions. I think 
that the fact that the court has found and stated on the 
record by both parties and by you when you argued, the 
court ought to fully reflected so the appellate court 
will have a chance to understand each of the stages of 
the decision, because I think it's a close enough case 
that it may well go on appeal. 
R. 225-6. 
10Actually, only Correctional Officer Metcalf testified that 
paraphernalia was observed in plain view. 
i:LNo findings were prepared. However, the trial court's 
comments from the bench are quite detailed and more than adequate 
for purposes of review. 
U 
Fully marshaled,12 the evidence supporting the trial 
court's factual finding that there was paraphernalia in plain view 
is as follows: 
1. Correctional Officer Metcalf testified: 
We noticed in plain view that there were several 
needles around the residence, laying on the couch. 
There was a coffee table that was in the residence 
and that also had some drug paraphernalia. 
Q. What kind of paraphernalia? 
A. Needles, little twists that are indicative of 
narcotics. 
R. 99. 
2. Officer Metcalf further testified: 
Q. Now, you indicated today that there were 




3. Officer Metcalf further testified: 
Q. You indicated in this report that Mr. 
Drage was searched incident to an arrest. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so you had arrested him at that 
point? 
A. We could have arrested him because of the 
close proximity that he was found to the drug 
paraphernalia. 
R. 131. 
No reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence adduced 
support the presence of plain view needles and paraphernalia. 
12E.g. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
("An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'") 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
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Against this evidence, is the following evidence to the 
contrary: 
1. Correctional Officer Smilker did not 
testify concerning any needles found in plain view, even 
though he was the officer that secured Mr. Drage and was 
thus in at least as good a position to notice any such 
items as Metcalf. 
2. Mr. Drage testified that there were no 
needles or paraphernalia in plain view: 
Q. Were there any items out there on the 
coffee table or any item out in plain view at that 
time? 
A. Ashtray, couple magazines, cigarettes, 
lighter. That's it. 
Q. The officers [sic] had testified about 
some needles being on the table. Did you see any 
needles on the table? 
A* No. There were no needles in plain view. 
Q. The officers [sic] also indicated that 
there were some paraphernalia on the coffee table. 
Was there any paraphernalia that you observed on 
the coffee table? 
A. No. 
R. 148-9. 
3. Metcalf prepared the evidence report 
(exhibit 2-D) for the entire warrant execution. A copy 
is attached as addendum B. Nowhere does it indicate that 
needles or paraphernalia were found in plain view in the 
living room. A total of nine entries are made, which 
indicate that paraphernalia was found in the hall closet, 
in the bathroom, and concealed on individuals. The 
report lists evidence as inconsequential as residency 
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papers, yet fails to list the needles and twists 
allegedly present all over the couch and coffee table. 
4 . Metcalf conceded that any paraphernalia in 
plain view should have been preserved and recorded on the 
evidence report. R. 123-127. Yet, no such evidence was 
preserved or recorded. 
5. The probable cause statement in the 
information, R. 8, states only that "defendant was found 
to be in possession of a syringe of suspected Heroin." 
No other paraphernalia is mentioned. 
6. None of the police reports, despite nine or ten 
officers being present, indicate that needles or paraphernalia 
were found in plain view. 
7. Not counting the three individuals named in the 
warrant and arrested thereunder, there were four individuals 
in the house. Of these four, only Mr. Drage was arrested. 
One was in the kitchen. One was in the bathroom, where it is 
documented that paraphernalia was found, but was not arrested. 
The last person was in the front room with the alleged needles 
and paraphernalia, but, unlike Mr. Drage's purported arrest, 
was not arrested. 
The trial court's finding that there were needles and 
paraphernalia present is so lacking in support as to be "against 
the clear weight of the evidence," thus making it "clearly 
erroneous." There is absolutely nothing to corroborate Officer 
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Metcalfs testimony that there were needles and paraphernalia in 
plain view. 
Despite the presence of nine or ten trained officers, 
plain view paraphernalia was not mentioned in a single police 
report. Officer Metcalf, as the officer in charge of gathering and 
preserving evidence, failed to preserve any of the purported plain 
view needles or paraphernalia. He conceded that any plain view 
evidence should have been preserved, and listed on the evidence 
report. R. 123. 
The evidence report, exhibit 2-D (attached as addendum 
B), is not overly complex or lengthy. There are a total of nine 
entries. There was plenty of room for additional entries. Had 
there been plain view needles and twists, it would have been a 
simple matter to record that fact on the report, and gather and 
preserve that evidence. 
The failure to gather and preserve the purported needles 
is especially surprising in light of the officers testimony that 
they consider needles to be dangerous weapons. R. 103 (Metcalf), 
13 9 (Smilker) . With the risk of spreading the HIV virus, one would 
expect that the police would carefully gather all such items to 
protect not only themselves, but the general public, completely 
apart and aside from their value as evidence in obtaining 
convictions. The fact that no such items were gathered, or 
reported in any police report at all, is indicative of the fact 
that no such items ever existed. Spoons with residue were 
gathered, ex. 2-D at p.3 entry 3, even though they are not in any 
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way dangerous. Why would the police not gather needles, which are 
by their very nature paraphernalia, and additionally may have 
residue, but more importantly pose a serious public health risk? 
Because there were none to gather. 
The failure to arrest the other three occupants for 
possession of needles and other paraphernalia is likewise strongly 
indicative of the fact that there was no plain view paraphernalia. 
Ramon Corales was present, but was not arrested. R. 13 0. 
Francisco Arrogon was present, but was not arrested. R. 13 0. Jay 
Gray was present, but was not arrested. R. 13 0. 
Mr Gray was found in the kitchen, R. 13 6, but there is 
nothing to indicate that the kitchen is not in plain view of the 
living room. Even were it not, Mr. Gray must have gone through the 
living room to get to the kitchen. He could have been arrested for 
possession of any paraphernalia found in plain view in the living 
room. Additionally, a spoon was found in the kitchen on the table. 
Ex. 2-D p.l entry 4. "On the table" is in plain view. Mr. Gray 
could have been arrested for possession of this paraphernalia. 
Evidently, the police were not arresting anyone not in immediate 
possession of paraphernalia. 
Either Corales or Arrogon was in the bathroom at the time 
the warrant was executed. R. 136. The evidence report indicates 
something, perhaps a needle (R. 127) was seized from the bathroom, 
ex. 2-D p.l entry 4, yet this person in the bathroom was not 
arrested for possession of paraphernalia. Evidently, the police 
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were not arresting anyone not in immediate possession of 
paraphernalia. 
The final person, either Corales or Arrogon, was in the 
small living room where the alleged paraphernalia allegedly was 
found. Yet, he was not arrested. Evidently, the police were not 
arresting anyone not in immediate possession of paraphernalia. 
Even Officer Metcalf's description of the arrest of Mr. 
Drage indicates that he was not arrested for possession of the 
alleged plain view needles and paraphernalia. Officer Metcalf 
testified "We could have arrested him because of the close 
proximity that he was found to the drug paraphernalia." R. 131. 
The use of "could" indicates that in fact Mr. Drage was NOT 
arrested for possession of the alleged plain view paraphernalia. 
Police officers are witnesses whose credibility must be 
assessed the same as any other witness. Cf. State v. Hewitt, 689 
P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984) (potential juror who had "strong and deep 
impressions with regard to the veracity of police officers' 
testimony and would credit a police officer's testimony to an undue 
extent" should have been stricken for cause); State v. Kavmark, 83 9 
P.2d 860, 866 (Utah App. 1992). Officer Metcalf, as an 
investigating officer and the officer primarily in charge of 
gathering and preserving evidence, had a vested interest in the 
outcome of each prosecution thereon. Officer Metcalf had a strong 
incentive to see that each prosecution was successful. Sadly, he 
succumbed to this pressure and fabricated evidence where none 
actually existed. 
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What actually happened is clear. Nine or ten officers 
entered the premises without warning. All occupants were secured 
and handcuffed. In accordance with Officer Smilker's testimony 
concerning standard practice, all occupants were fully searched, 
including contents of pockets and wallets. Then, the police 
arrested those individuals named in the warrant (Arturo Cordova, 
Frank Penman, and Randy Chatfield, and any individual who was found 
in direct possession of drugs or paraphernalia. Only Mr. Drage 
fell in this latter category. All others were released. The 
"plain view paraphernalia" is purely a fabrication concocted in an 
attempt to avoid the inevitable result of appellant's suppression 
motion. It should be rejected as such. 
The trial court's finding that there were needles and 
other paraphernalia in plain view is clearly erroneous. The search 
of Mr. Drage cannot be upheld as being incident to an arrest for 
this nonexistent paraphernalia. The judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Drage respectfully requests that the trial court's 
order denying his motion to suppress be reversed, and that the 




RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this b day of August, 1996 
rROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber 
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6thjvFloor, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 3 day of August, 1996. 
4lfrtH~ 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of August, 1996. 
24 
ADDENDUM A 
Search warrant and supporting affidavit (ex. 1-D) 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
t DEFENDANT'S 
I EXHIBIT 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by Theresa Sargent, I am satisfied that there is probable cause 
to believe; 
That on the person(s) known as MRandyM and f,ArturoH last names 
unknown who are known to reside or visit the residence to be 
searched; 
and/or 
in the vehicle described as a 1975 Ford 2T, Utah License 
#445 GRB, VIN #5G21H129360; 
and/or 
on the premises known as 1234 lola, further described as 
being on the northeast corner of lola and Concord, 
constructed of white aluminum siding with blue awnings over 
the front windows of the residence, with the number 1234 on 
the front of the residence by the front door along with all 
attached and unattached structures within the curtilage. 
In the city of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
1. Controlled substances, including but not limited to 
cocaine and marijuana; 
2. packaging material for the use, ingestion, and 
distribution of controlled substances; 
3. residency papers, and other materials to identify the 
occupants and residents of the dwelling to be searched; 
4. U.S. currency used in the trafficking in or in 
proximity to controlled substances; 
5. records of controlled substance transactions; 
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SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense/ or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to illegal conduct. 
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SEARCH WARRANT 
You are therefore commanded 
at any time day or night, good cause having been shown 
to execute without notice of authority or purpose, proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search 
warrant may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm 
may result to any person if notice were given 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s) and/or 
vehicle(s) and/or premises for the herein-above described 
property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before mc at the Third Circuit 
Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated th :his 1995. 
MAGISTRATE V '^ J 
Neal Gunnarson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 394 5 
Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
R A T E ^ Y 
BEFORE: f ^V M M LI L, TJ(/W\AM/^K X 4 S 0 South 200 East 
AGISTRATE ^~^ Y ADDRESS 
as 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
« 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Theresa Sargent, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
That he/she has reason to believe 
That on the person(s) known as "Arturo" and "Randy" last names 
unknown who are known to reside or visit the residence to be 
searched; 
and/or 
in the vehicle described as a 1975 Ford 2T, Utah License 
#445 GRB, VIN #5G21H129360. 
and/or 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
on the premises known 3 234 Iola, further described as being 
located on the northeast corner of Iola and Concord, constructed 
of white frame siding with blue awnings above the front windows, 
with the number 1234 attached to the residence next to the 
mailbox on the east side of the front door along with all 
attached and unattached structures within the curtilage. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
1. Controlled substances, including but not limited to 
cocaine and heroin; 
2. packaging material for the use, ingestion, and 
distribution of controlled substances: 
3. residency papers, and other materials to identify the 
occupants and residents of the dwelling to be searched; 
4. U.S. currency used in trafficking in or in proximity to 
controlled substances; 
5. records of controlled substance transactions; 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense/ or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime or crimes of possession, use and 
distribution of controlled substances. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant is employed by the Department of Corrections 
and is an investigator for the Investigations Bureau of the 
Department. Your affiant has seven years of law enforcement 
experience, and in that time has made and assisted with numerous 
drug-related arrests. Your affiant has certified peace officer 
authority within the State of Utah. Your affiant has been given 
the responsibility of enforcing all laws and conditions of parole 
pertaining to probationers, parolees, and inmates under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Department of Corrections- Your 
affiant has received in-service post certified training on drug 
recognition. Your affiant received advanced undercover drug 
training in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1994. Your affiant has worked 
the Intensive Drug Supervision Program in Davis County for three 
years. As part of that program your affiant has worked multi 
jurisdictional drug cases from 1989 to present. Your affiant is 
currently assigned drug cases which fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Corrections. Your affiant has worked in an 
undercover capacity as well as a narcotics case agent from 1989 
to the present. Your affiant is currently investigating a 
complaint relating to a controlled substance distribution 
operation being conducted at the main premises on this 
Warrant/Affidavit. Your affiant is also investigating a 
complaint of fugitives being harbored at the main premises on 
this Warrant/Affidavit. 
The facts to establish grounds for a search warrant are: 
Within the last four days your affiant has conducted a drug 
investigation. Your affiant received information from a 
confidential informant, who wishes to remain confidential, that 
"Arturo", last name unknown, is distributing drugs for value. 
The confidential informant reports "Arturo" does not reside at 
this residence, however uses this residence from 10:00 a.m. until 
6:30 p.m. to distribute drugs with the permission of the owner, 
Frank Penman. The confidential informant stated "Randy" last name 
unknown is a parole fugitive and is residing at the premises on 
this Warrant/Affidavit. 
Surveillance of the residence was conducted between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on January 20 and January 22, 1995. 
During the times of surveillance a total of twenty one 
individuals were observed arriving at the residence and leaving 
after short periods of time. The surveillance held on the 
residence was conducted for approximately two hour intervals on 
both ocassions. Several of the individuals arrived on foot and 
the remaining arrived in vehicles. Your affiant received age 
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information from the confidential informant that MRandyM last 
name unknown, is a parole fugitive and is residing at this 
address to avoid apprehension. 
The investigation revealed some individuals frequenting the 
residence have been arrested for the 
t:ransportation/po8session/manuf acture of drugs . 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
Confidential Informant reliable because he/she has worked as a 
confidential informant for DEA. Detective Maria Tellas/Waters of 
DEA indicated the Confidential Informant has introduced her to 
several drug dealers and she has successfully purchased 
controlled substances from these -dealers". Confidential 
Informant has also provided information to the U.S. Marshalls, 
specifically Rick Lovelace, regarding the location of a federal 
fugitive. The Marshalls were able to successfully apprehend the 
fugitive without incident based solely on information provided by 
the confidential informant. 
Your affiant asks the Court not to require your affiant to 
reveal the name of the CI for fear of physical retaliation by the 
suspect(s) involved in this case or by any of the criminal 
associates. Threats of physical harm against individuals thought 
to be confidential informants are commonplace. 
Through information received from the confidential 
informant, "Arturo" brings approximately two to three grams of 
heroin and two to three ounces of cocaine on his person, into the 
residence to sell. Due to the high risk factor that the suspect 
will destroy evidence aJong with the fact fugitives are in the 
residence who are avoiding apprehension, for the safety of the 
officers involved and the preservation of evidence, your affiant 
is requesting a no knock search warrant. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct: and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
Personal observations of what appears to be drug trafficking 
at the residence previously described in this affidavit and 
the personally observation of official records listing 
criminal histories and parole status of those individuals 
observed at the residence. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good 
reasons, to wit: 
As previously described, the cover of darkness will help 
protect the officers executing the warrant and prevent the 
destruction of evidence-
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested 
warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority 
or purpose because: 
physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
There are individuals in the residence who have warrants for 
their arrests and are avoiding apprehension. 
\9Ajurm Sargent 
INVESTIGATOR THERESAJ SARGI 
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ADDENDUM C 
Correctional Officer Metcalf's report (ex. 3-D) 
11 EXHIBIT 
1 CASE # 95-1057 |l <?S /9 00 3&S 
2 SEARCH WARRANT AT 1234 IOLA AVE SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
3 JANUARY 25,1995 
H CASE AGENT STEPHEN METCALF 
£> dp <p 
S ASSISTING OFFICERS: THERESA GABALDON UDC, SGT BRAD BLAIR, TFO MARK 
* MEHRER, ^PFO DICK TISHNER, feLEO LUCEY UDC/^TFO TROY NAYLOR, $ART 
7 STREET UDC,©KEVIN NITZEL UDC,(*TFO KEN YURGELON ,£^FO TOM RUSSELL, 
% S^OTT CHRISTENSEN UDC,Q4ICK SPILKER UDC. 
<? On January 25, 1995 a joint operation between the Utah Department 
\z of Corrections and the DEA-Metro Task Force was culminated with the 
a execution of a search warrant at 1234 lola in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
»i At 1707 hours on January 25, 1995 entry was made without incident 
i3 at the residence. Found in the residence were seven individuals. 
H Arturo Cordova DOB 4-17-65, Frank Penman 3-28-47, Randall Dean 
tf Chatfield 11-21-51, David Drage 5-11-62, Ramom Corales 12-23-60, 
tt» Francisco Aragon 3-24-47, and Jay Gray 1-12-35. 
»7 Upon entry I encountered an individual later identified as Frank 
£ Penman. Mr. Penman was handcuffed for officer safety and sat on the 
fl floor. I then handcuffed Arturo Cordova and also placed him on the 
2c floor. After all individuals were secured. I asked Mr. Penman if he 
£| had any thing he shouldn't have on him. He stated he did not. I 
2* again asked him if he had any needles on him. He stated he did not. 
-& Mr. Penman was searched incident to arrest and was not found to 
-2H have any contraband on his person. I then sat Mr. Penman on the 
2J couch. Mr. Cordova was asked in he had any needles on his person 
z<, and he stated "no but I have some drugs." I asked Cordova if he had 
21 "cheeva" (cheeva is the Spanish term for heroin) on him and he 
% stated "yes and cocaine." Upon searching Arturo Cordova I found 
^ approximately 1 ounce of heroin in his left front pocket and 1/8 
5o ounce of cocaine in his right front pocket. 
31 I also found a quantity of U.S. Currency on his person. The 
3?. controlled substances were turned over to evidence custodian Mark 
S3 Mehrer. These substances were field tested in my presence by 
tf evidence custodian Mark Mehrer and showed positive for cocaine and 
3? heroin. The heroin was in 8 separate packages weighing 
3c approximately 1/2 ounce total and the remaining was in one large 
jf piece this large piece also weighed approximately 1/2 ounce. 
J 
2. 
i The person in the residence identified as Randall Dean Chatfield 
z was found to be wanted on a Parole violation warrant from the Utah 
3 State Board of Pardons. During a search incident to arrest, 
v Chatfield was found to be in possession of four syringes. Chatfield 
$ initially resisted officers and appeared to be hiding something. 
6 However no other contraband aside from the syringes were found. 
7 Chatfield indicated he knew he was wanted and also stated he has 
g been using heroin. 
*? The person identified as David Drage 5-11-62, was found to be in 
ic possession of a syringe filled with a substance identified as 
i« heroin, (field test positive). Prior to the search of Drage he was 
it asked if he had any needles on him and he stated he did not. Search 
/3 incident to arrest the needle filled with heroin was found. 
»* Several needles were found in the residence. The other individuals 
i-i were not found to be in possession of any contraband and were 
/* released. 
IT David Drage was booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on charges of 
it possession of heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. Arturo 
ti Cordova was booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on charges of 
ac Possession of heroin with the intent to distribute and Possession 
2i of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The individuals were 
^ booked without incident by Theresa Gabaldon and Leo Lucey. 
23
 Randall Dean Chatfield was turned over to AP&P Agents Jeff Stickley 
in and Paul Truelson for transportation and booking. 
2* Stephen Metcalf 
a* DEA-Metro Task Force 
ADDENDUM D 
Trial court rulings, R. 194-6, 214-5, 225-6 
1 THE COURT: I WANT TO THANK YOU, BOTH OF YOU, 
2 FOR ARGUING THE ISSUE SO WELL. 
3 I BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL SOMEDAY BE A CASE 
4 WITH ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FACTS AS THIS CASE IN WHICH A 
5 WARRANT WILL PROPERLY DEFINE AS PERSONS TO BE SEARCHED 
6 UNNAMED PERSONS THAT ARE PRESENT IN A DRUG HOUSE AND BE 
7 ABLE TO DO SO WITH THE BACKGROUND THAT THERE HAS BEEN 
8 SURVEILLANCE AND OBSERVATION AND SHORT-TERM PURCHASES, 
9 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, AND WHAT THE HOUSE ENGAGED IN IS 
10 DRUG TRAFFICKING SUCH THAT A MAGISTRATE WILL BELIEVE 
11 THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE 
12 HOUSE, EVEN IF UNNAMED, AND WILL PRESENT THE OPPORTUNITY 
13 FOR THE COURT TO GO BEYOND THE YBARRA CASE, WHICH INVITES 
14 THE WARRANT THAT EXISTS IN THAT CASE. 
15 I DON'T BELIEVE THAT SITUATION EXISTS HERE. I 
16 BELIEVE THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF IS DEFECTIVE IN DEFINING 
17 AS THE PERSONS TO BE SEARCHED EACH PERSON IN THE HOUSE. 
18 AND THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE 
19 EVIDENCE THAT WAS BEING SOUGHT AS RESIDENCY PAPERS AND 
20 OTHER MATERIALS TO IDENTIFY THE OCCUPANTS AND RESIDENTS 
21 WHO ARE GOING TO BE SEARCHED DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE 
22 THAT EACH PERSON IN THE HOUSE IS TO BE SEARCHED BECAUSE 
23 THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE ENGAGED 
24 IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
25 AND IF YOU LOOK AT THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THE 
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1 WARRANT IT SAYS: 
2 "PROPERTY OR EVIDENCE: WAS 
3 UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED OR IS UNLAWFULLY POSSESSED 
4 OR HAS BEEN USED TO COMMIT OR CONCEAL A PUBLIC 
5 OFFENSE, OR IS BEING POSSESSED WITH THE 
6 PURPOSE TO USE IT AS A MEANS OF COMMITTING OR 
7 CONCEALING A PUBLIC OFFENSE, OR CONSISTS OF AN 
8 ITEM OF, OR CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE OF, ILLEGAL 
9 CONDUCT, POSSESSED BY A PARTY TO ILLEGAL 
10 CONDUCT." 
11 THAT DOESN'T TO ME FIT PARAGRAPH THREE WHICH IS 
12 ASKING FOR RESIDENCY PAPERS AND OTHER MATERIALS TO 
13 IDENTIFY THE OCCUPANTS AND RESIDENTS OF THE DWELLING TO 
14 BE SEARCHED AS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR FINDING OR FOR 
15 ESTABLISHING THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
16 SO I'M GOING TO HOLD THAT THE WARRANT DOES NOT 
17 CONTEMPLATE THE SEARCH OF EACH OCCUPANT AND DOES NOT 
18 PURPORT TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
I 
19 EACH OCCUPANT OF THE HOUSE, EVEN IF I THINK THE 
20 CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED BY MR. MEISTER MAY 
21 WELL DO SO. I'M NOT SAYING YES OR NO ON THAT. I THINK 
22 THAT'S BEYOND THE SCOPE OF MY-- OF THIS QUESTION ONCE HE 
23 DECIDED THE WARRANT ITSELF WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
24 PARTICULAR AS TO THE BASIS FOR SEARCHING EACH OCCUPANT. 
25 I'M TAKING SOME PAINS TO DESCRIBE THIS BECAUSE 
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1 WHEN THIS IS OVER WITH I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FINDINGS OF 
2 FACT ON THIS SO IT COULD BE WELL ENOUGH IDENTIFIED TO AN 
3 APPELLATE COURT TO UNDERSTAND THE BASIS FOR MY RULING ON 
4 EACH OF THOSE POINTS, AND THAT I THINK I STATED THE BASIS 
5 FOR THAT. BUT I'M GOING TO ASK ONE OF YOU, AS I CONCLUDE 
6 THIS MATTER, TO COMPLETE FINDINGS THAT WILL BE 
7 SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIPTIVE TO INFORM AN APPELLATE COURT WHY 
8 I'M DOING WHAT I'M DOING. 
9 THAT TAKES US THEN TO THE NEXT QUESTION AND 
10 THAT IS THE DISCUSSION, IN MY MIND, OF THE 
11 APPROPRIATENESS OF THE TERRY FRISK. ONCE THE NO-KNOCK 
12 WAS EXECUTED, I THINK THE ISSUE, IN MY MIND HERE, IS IN 
13 CONDUCTING A TERRY FRISK. 
14 DOES THE OFFICER, ASSUMING IT'S PERMISSIBLE 
15 WHEN YOU EXECUTE A NO-KNOCK WARRANT TO SECURE EACH OF THE 
16 INHABITANTS OF THE HOUSE, ASSUMING-- I THINK THAT'S 
17 CLEAR, YOU KNOW, YOU DO A NO-KNOCK, YOU MAKE SURE 
18 EVERYBODY HAS BEEN SECURED SO THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO 
19 WORRY ABOUT EVIDENCE BEING DESTROYED, SOMEBODY RUNNING 
20 OFF OR SOMEBODY DOING-- COMMITTING SOME KIND OF A 
21 DANGEROUS ACT. IF YOU SUCCEEDED IN SECURING EVERYONE, I 
22 THINK THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR, IS IT STILL A REASONABLE 
2 3 PART OF POLICE PROCEDURE WITHOUT MORE TO ENGAGE A 
24 PAT-DOWN? 
2 5 I MEAN THAT'S WHAT I WANT TO HEAR YOU ARGUE AND 
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1 WE'RE USING AS FAR AS THE INDEPENDENT PROBABLE CAUSE, IF 
2 HE'S NOT NAMED IN THE WARRANT— 
3 THE COURT: RIGHT. I GUESS WHAT I-- I SEQUENCE 
4 IT DIFFERENTLY. IT SEEMS TO M E — AND I HEARD ENOUGH OF 
5 YOUR ARGUMENT THAT I THINK I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION ON 
6 THIS, AND I THINK I'M PREPARED TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF 
7 THE TERRY FRISK, IN MY MIND, THAT THERE IS A BASIS FOR A 
8 TERRY FRISK. AND I THINK THE DISPOSITIVE CRITICAL FACTS 
9 ARE THE ONES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE 
10 ONES THAT ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR THE NO-KNOCK WARRANT: 
11 THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SURVEILLANCE OF THE HOUSE 
12 INDICATING SHORT-TERM VISITS, WE HAVE CONFIDENTIAL 
13 INFORMANTS, WE HAVE AT LEAST REASONABLE SUSPICION, OR 
14 MORE THAN THAT WE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT 
15 THERE'S A FUGITIVE IN THE HOUSE AND THAT THERE IS A 
16 SUSPECTED DRUG DEALER IN THE HOUSE. 
17 ALL OF THAT SEEMED TO ME TO CREATE A TOTALITY 
18 OF CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH THE OFFICER COULD FIND A 
19 BASIS FOR CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY THAT WOULD JUSTIFY 
20 A SEARCH, A TERRY FRISK, AS PART OF THE NO-KNOCK IN 
21 SECURING WHAT I WAS INTERESTED IN HEARING ARGUMENTS 
22 ABOUT. AND I THINK I'M SATISFIED WHEN OFFICERS GO ON AND 
23 SECURE A PREMISE, TO IMPOSE UPON THEM THE DUTY TO SORT OF 
24 LOOK AT EVERYBODY AND SAY: OKAY. NOW, I'M NOT GOING TO 




2 THAT'S ASKING FOR TOO MUCH REFINEMENT OF WHAT 
3 IS OTHERWISE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. THEY HAVE TO 
4 HAVE CLEAR GUIDANCE AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ONCE THEY'RE 
5 JUSTIFIED FOR THE NO-KNOCK AND ONCE THEY HAVE A WARRANT 
6 THAT SUGGESTS THAT THERE'S DRUG USE, DRUG DEALING AND 
7 FUGITIVES AND ALL THAT ACCOMPANIED IN THIS WARRANT, WHEN 
8 THEY GO IN THE OFFICERS CAN BOTH SECURE THE PARTIES THAT 
9 ARE THERE TO ASSURE THEIR SAFETY AND ASSURE THE PUBLIC'S 
10 SAFETY AND TO ASSURE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION 
11 OF EVIDENCE. AND AS PART OF THAT THEY CAN ALSO DO AT 
12 LEAST A PAT-DOWN SEARCH. 
13 AND I THINK THAT TAKES US TO WHAT I CONSIDER TO 
14 BE THE LAST STEP OF THIS THING. ALL RIGHT. THEY DO A 
15 PAT DOWN AND MAYBE GO BEYOND THAT WITH RESPECT TO THIS 
16 DEFENDANT. I DON'T THINK I'M RULING ON WHETHER OR NOT 
17 THEY HAD ANY RIGHT TO GET INTO HIS POCKET. THERE'S THE 
18 ONE CASE THAT WAS REFERRED TO ME WHICH INDICATED, YOU 
19 KNOW, A SOFT POUCH IS NOT A WEAPON. THAT'S THE--
20 IS THAT WHAT THAT CASE SAYS? A SOFT POUCH? 
21 MR. MAURO: YBARRA. 
22 MR. MEISTER: AYALA. 
2 3 THE COURT: AYALA. 
2 4 MR. MAURO: AYALA. 
25 THE COURT: AYALA, THAT'S THE CASE. 
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THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WITHOUT MORE, BEING INSUFFICIENT 
TO FORM A BASIS FOR, IN THOSE CASES, REASONABLE 
SUSPICION. IN THIS CASE I SUGGEST THE STATE NEEDS 
PROBABLE CAUSE. AND THOSE CASES ARE CITED, BROWN VERSUS 
TEXAS, STEWART-- THERE'S ALSO A CASE CALLED STATE VERSUS 
MUNSON, AND IN MUNSON THEY SAID THE MERE PROPINQUITY TO 
OTHERS SUSPECTED OF A CRIME IS NOT A BASIS TO CONDUCT THE 
REASONABLE SUSPICION STOP, MUCH LESS IN THIS CASE A 
PROBABLE CAUSE STOP. 
WITH THAT, YOUR HONOR, WE'LL SUBMIT IT. 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK I'M READY TO RULE ON 
THIS. 
IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ONCE YOU GET TO THE POINT 
WHERE THE OFFICER IS DOING A PAT-DOWN AND FEELS A NEEDLE 
THAT YOU HAVE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH 
ARE PART OF THIS, PROBABLE CAUSE TO COMPLETE THE SEARCH 
OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECT AN ARREST. AND I LISTENED TO 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS, AND EVEN THOUGH THEY 
DIDN'T LIST THE PARAPHERNALIA THAT WAS IN THE FRONT ROOM 
ON THE EVIDENCE SHEET, I FELT THAT THEY WERE CREDIBLE. 
CERTAINLY THEY COULDN'T IDENTIFY THAT PARAPHERNALIA AS 
BEING THE DEFENDANT'S IN THE CASE. BUT IN MY VIEW THE 
FACT THAT THERE WAS PARAPHERNALIA AROUND THERE AS WELL AS 
THE PRESENCE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING, WHICH I THINK WAS 




























HAVE ALREADY BEEN ENUNCIATED AT THE HEARING, IT SEEMED TO 
ME THAT THERE WAS PLENTY OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST AND 
A SEARCH INCIDENT TO THAT ARREST WHICH WAS SUFFICIENTLY 
CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE DISCOVERY OF THE NEEDLE WHICH 
WAS DETECTED BY THE PAT-DOWN TO BE A PROPER BASIS TO DENY 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. SO FOR THE REASONS THE COURT 
STATED I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION. 
I WOULD ASK MR. MEISTER IF YOU WOULD PREPARE 
DETAILED FINDINGS ON THIS. I THINK WE HAVE A CASE IN 
WHICH THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CLOSE QUESTIONS. I THINK 
THAT THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS FOUND AND STATED ON THE 
RECORD BY BOTH PARTIES AND BY YOU WHEN YOU ARGUED, THE 
COURT OUGHT TO BS FULLY REFLECTED SO THE APPELLATE COURT 
WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO UNDERSTAND EACH OF THE STAGES OF 
THE DECISION, BECAUSE I THINK IT'S A CLOSE ENOUGH CASE 
THAT IT MAY WELL GO ON APPEAL. 
MR. MEISTER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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